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This study focuses on how and why firms strategically respond to government signals on appropriate corporate activity.We integrate institutional theory with research on corporate political strategy to develop a political dependence model
that explains (a) how different types of dependency on the government lead firms to issue corporate social responsibility
(CSR) reports and (b) how the risk of governmental monitoring affects the extent to which CSR reports are symbolic or
substantive. First, we examine how firm characteristics reflecting dependence on the government—including private versus
state ownership, executives serving on political councils, political legacy, and financial resources—affect the likelihood of
firms issuing CSR reports. Second, we focus on the symbolic nature of CSR reporting and how variance in the risk of
government monitoring through channels such as bureaucratic embeddedness and regional government institutional devel-
opment influences the extent to which CSR communications are symbolically decoupled from substantive CSR activities.
Our database includes all CSR reports issued by the approximately 1,600 publicly listed Chinese firms between 2006 and
2009. Our hypotheses are generally supported. The political perspective we develop contributes to organizational theory by
showing that (a) government signaling is an important mechanism of political influence, (b) different types of dependency
on the government expose firms to different types of legitimacy pressure, and (c) firms face a decoupling risk that makes
them more likely to enact substantive CSR actions in situations in which they are likely to be monitored.
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Introduction
The implications and antecedents of firms’ political
strategies have emerged as important areas of research
in organizational theory (Bonardi et al. 2005, Hillman
et al. 2004). Governments control critical resources that
shape firms’ competitive positions, for example, through
regulations affecting an industry or through tax poli-
cies favoring certain regions (Baron 1995, Schuler and
Rehbein 1997). Scholars have identified a number of
ways that firms act strategically in managing their rela-
tionships with governmental actors, including political
activities such as lobbying, establishing political action
committees (PACs), and advocacy or testimony on key
issues (Hillman 2003, Hillman et al. 2004, Lord 2000,
Mizruchi 1992, Quasney 2003). Whereas this research
has focused on how firms work to actively shape govern-
ment rule-making processes, other research has shown
that in addition to setting rules and engaging in coer-
cive processes, governments also use signaling processes
to create norms and standards of legitimacy for firms
(Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman
1990, 1992). Yet research on corporate political strategy
has not, to our knowledge, addressed how and why firms
respond strategically to government signals.
In this paper, we investigate the factors that render a
firm more or less likely to adhere to government signals
in an effort to shape perceptions of its political legiti-
macy, which we define as the extent to which the gov-
ernment views the firm’s actions as being in accordance
with norms and laws. Consistent with work on corpo-
rate political strategy proposing that firms seek present
or future resources from governments, we view politi-
cal legitimacy, which is associated with greater access to
government resources, as a strategic resource for firms
(Hillman 2005, Li and Zhang 2007, Peng and Luo 2000,
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Furthermore, this resource
may be especially important in emerging economies
where weak formal institutions can lead firms to rely
more on informal mechanisms (La Porta et al. 1998,
Peng and Heath 1996). The political response model
we develop focuses on two key factors that shape a
firm’s response to government signals: political depen-
dence and government monitoring.
If adhering to government signals results from a
firm’s desire to appear more legitimate to the gov-
ernment, then it is important to recognize that firms
vary in their dependence on governmental actors and
that this variation should influence their responses to
127
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.10
3.1
49
.52
] o
n 2
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
, a
t 0
6:4
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marquis and Qian: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?
128 Organization Science 25(1), pp. 127–148, © 2014 INFORMS
government signals. Specifically, we examine how key
features of a firm’s political embeddedness that shape
its need for legitimacy—e.g., state versus private own-
ership (Chen 2007, Li and Zhang 2007), network con-
nections to national political congresses (Hillman 2005,
Ma and Parish 2006), political legacy (Kriauciunas and
Kale 2006, Marquis and Huang 2010), and financial
resources—result in firms being more or less likely to
follow government signals.
However, research has also found that such legitimacy
pressures can result in decoupling processes whereby
corporate responses to external demands vary in the
extent to which they are symbolic or substantive (Meyer
and Rowan 1977, Okhmatovskiy and David 2012, Oliver
1991). In this paper, we also explore the extent to
which symbolic action in response to government sig-
nals depends on the likelihood of a firm being moni-
tored by governmental actors. Research on decoupling
has shown that the implementation of symbolic strate-
gies is typically not monitored by stakeholders (Zajac
and Westphal 2004). We introduce the notion that firms
face a “decoupling risk” if they respond only symboli-
cally to government signals: exposure of the decoupling
may harm the firm. Specifically, we argue that a combi-
nation of (a) a firm’s bureaucratic embeddedness, i.e., its
network connections within the government bureaucracy
as opposed to its connections to national congresses
(Fan et al. 2007), and (b) regional government insti-
tutional development (Brandt and Li 2003, Goldstein
1995) subject the firm to more government monitor-
ing. We focus on why highly monitored firms that are
at greater risk of having symbolic action exposed are
more likely to adhere substantively to government sig-
nals. Figure 1 describes the general model we propose
and the context-specific factors that we elaborate in our
hypotheses below.
Figure 1 A General Model of Firm Response to Government Signals with Application to CSR Reporting in China
• Government issues
   statements about CSR and
   CSR reporting
• Firms issue or don’t issue
   CSR reports
• Firms’ CSR reporting is
   more or less substantive
• Bureaucratic
   embeddedness
• Regional government
   institutional development
• Political connection to
   national congresses
• Political legacy
• Financial resources
Government signals
legitimacy guidelines
Organizational response
Political dependence Political monitoring
Decoupling
Our empirical context is the introduction and spread
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting among
all publicly listed Chinese firms from 2006 to 2009. This
context is in many ways ideal to study the issues of
interest. First, it is an activity that the Chinese govern-
ment has been actively signaling to firms as legitimate
and important. Since 2006, when China’s 11th Five-Year
Plan initiated the idea that China should pursue a more
“harmonious society,” the central government has issued
a number of CSR reporting guidelines for large firms as
a strategy to help balance China’s extensive economic
growth with the social and environmental effects of that
growth (See 2009). It is important to note that these gov-
ernmental issuances are not specific laws or mandates
but are examples of a government signaling what it con-
siders to be an important area of corporate focus.
As of 2009, Chinese firms issued over 15% of the
world’s CSR reports, yet there is significant variation
across Chinese firms in the amount of information dis-
closed on specific CSR activities (China WTO Tribune
2009). This variation allows us to determine the extent to
which the reports are purely symbolic exercises or indica-
tive of substantive CSR activities. In the political econ-
omy of China, significant state ownership of many firms
and the extensive and varied connections between the
government and large firms allow us to examine how
the effect of government signaling varies depending on
the degree of direct government control. Furthermore,
the extensive data available on these publicly listed firms
allow us to statistically control for other potential expla-
nations such as variations across industries and pressures
from international shareholders and consumers.
Our paper makes a number of contributions to orga-
nizational theory. First, we show how dependence and
monitoring create variations in firms’ strategic adher-
ence to government signals about legitimate activities;
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we thus integrate neoinstitutional insights on the norma-
tive mechanisms of the state (e.g., Dobbin and Sutton
1998) with work on political strategy (Hillman et al.
2004). We discuss how this perspective is particularly
relevant to emerging markets in which laws and reg-
ulations are frequently weak and enforcement is lack-
ing (La Porta et al. 1998, Peng and Heath 1996, Young
et al. 2008). We argue further that these insights are
essential to developing a theory of political strategy that
encompasses the diversity of corporate political mecha-
nisms around the globe. Second, we show that different
types of corporate political network ties (that is, ties to
national congresses versus ties to the operating bureau-
cracy) affect firm behavior differently. Some political
ties, such as executives serving on political councils, are
more symbolic, resulting in correspondingly symbolic
CSR action. Other ties, such as the extent of embed-
dedness in government bureaucracy, are more ongoing
and concern material resources (Fan et al. 2007) and are
therefore associated with greater monitoring and result
in more substantial CSR action. Thus, the use of polit-
ical networks can be a double-edged sword; they can
increase access to resources but at the cost of more gov-
ernment monitoring. Finally, we contribute to institu-
tional theory more specifically by introducing the idea
that firms perceive a decoupling risk that leads to vari-
ations in symbolic strategies (Tilcsik 2010, Westphal
and Zajac 2001) depending on the extent of external
monitoring.
China’s Political Economy and
CSR Reporting
Since China introduced its open-door economic reform
policy in 1978, the country has developed a unique
hybrid market economy. Since the mid-1980s, many
Chinese firms have been transformed from govern-
ment entities to publicly traded state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). The two Chinese stock exchanges, Shanghai
and Shenzhen, were founded in the early 1990s, and by
2009, they had over 1,600 listed firms. Table 1 provides
details on the recent growth of publicly listed firms in
China from 1999 to 2008, particularly SOEs and pri-
vately controlled firms.
Although SOEs have sold shares to outside investors,
the government still maintains considerable ownership
and control of these firms (Guthrie 2009). It holds sig-
nificant sway over the economy and is a critical source
Table 1 Publicly Listed Firms in China by Type of Control, 1999–2008
Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of listed firms 930 1,088 1,140 1,204 1,258 1,355 1,351 1,434 1,529 1,592
% privately control 16088 18059 18042 22059 26055 30085 30079 35029 38078 39057
% state owned 83012 81041 81058 77041 73045 69015 69021 64071 61022 60043
of resources and legitimacy for firms (Naughton 2007).
The central government and governments at other lev-
els can still allocate such important business resources
as licenses and permits, subsidies, and project approval
(Li et al. 2008). However, a critical issue in such con-
texts is that the lack of a rule of law and the lack of
government transparency can obscure the government’s
priorities and decision-making processes (He and Tian
2008, Young et al. 2008). Thus, as we argue below, firms
face greater ambiguity in how to interact with the gov-
ernment. Responding appropriately to government sig-
nals becomes a critical way to build legitimacy with
governmental actors (Marquis et al. 2011).
Chinese government priorities have been articulated
in five-year plans since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). These plans provide a state-
ment of national economic development goals and lay
out objectives for the subsequent five years (Naughton
2007). Many observers perceived an important shift in
China’s economic development in 2006, when the Hu
Jintao administration announced the 11th Five-Year Plan
for National Economic and Social Development, artic-
ulating a national vision based on the principles of a
harmonious society and scientific development. This was
widely viewed as a signal that the government was shift-
ing from a policy of economic growth at all costs to one
of economic growth balanced with the need to tackle
pressing social and environmental problems (See 2009).
That same year, the Sixth Plenum of the 16th Commu-
nist Party Committee (CPC) Central Committee stated
that firms should “create a harmonious situation in which
everyone promotes harmony, and focusing on enhancing
a sense of social responsibility amongst citizens, enter-
prises and all kinds of organizations” (Sino-Swedish
CSR Cooperation 2009).
In close succession, other governmental actors, includ-
ing the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission, issued guidelines and recommendations on
reporting corporate social and environmental activities
as best practices for firms under their control (Lin 2010).
Recently published in-depth case studies document the
critical effect these steps had on CSR reporting practices
in China (Marquis et al. 2010, 2011). For example, the
first Chinese reference book providing practical guid-
ance on preparing a CSR report was published in 2008
under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
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(Yin et al. 2008). In addition, the government devel-
oped its own reporting standard for Chinese companies
(see, for example, Zhong 2009 for Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS) standards 1.0 and 2.0). The
bottom line, as noted by practitioners, is that whereas
a Western company might “focus on its customers and
investors as its most vital constituencies, the government
sits at the top of the CSR pyramid in China as the impor-
tant stakeholder in a business” (ChinaCSR.com 2009).
Table A.1 in the appendix provides details of some of
the critical communications the government has issued
related to CSR and CSR reporting.1
Many observers have therefore concluded that (a) the
government is sending signals through many channels
that CSR is an appropriate and desired activity (Marquis
et al. 2011, See 2009), and (b) Chinese firms have there-
fore stepped up the pace of their CSR activities, particu-
larly reporting, since 2006 (China WTO Tribune 2009).
Global firms have been introducing CSR reports since
the 1990s, with over 80% of the largest firms worldwide
issuing reports by 2005 (KPMG 2008), but large Chinese
SOEs such as State Grid, the COSCO Group, China
Mobile, and the Baosteel Group did not begin publish-
ing annual sustainability or CSR reports until after these
government signals began in 2006. In our database of
approximately 1,600 Chinese publicly listed firms, 536
have issued at least one CSR report since then. Figure 2
shows the number of reports disclosed by Chinese pub-
licly listed firms since 2006.
However, the quality of these reports varies signifi-
cantly; in general, Chinese CSR reporting has been criti-
cized for its low quality (China WTO Tribune 2009). For
instance, half the reports released contained only limited
information on specific CSR activities; only 7.8% of the
reports referred to the Global Reporting Initiative’s G3
(GRI 3.0) guidelines, the main international standard; and
only 6.1% of the firms solicited third-party opinions of
their reports (China WTO Tribune 2009). Thus, although
Chinese firms may appear to be following government
Figure 2 Number of CSR Reports Issued by Chinese
Publicly Listed Firms, 2006–2009
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signals regarding CSR, it is clear that not all of them are
doing so in a substantive way.
CSR Reporting as a Political Strategy
in China
Governments control critical resources that shape firms’
competitive environments and positions. As noted, polit-
ical strategy research has focused on governmental activ-
ities such as regulation, subsidies, and taxation (Schuler
and Rehbein 1997), showing that firms are strategic in
managing their relationships with government entities so
as to enhance their own positions (Hillman et al. 2004,
Schuler et al. 2002). With political activities such as lob-
bying, political donations, and testimony, firms seek to
reduce uncertainty, decrease transaction costs, and cre-
ate business opportunities (Bonardi et al. 2006, Hillman
et al. 1999, Lord 2000). Research on corporate political
activities in the West has generally supported the notion
that the greater the role of the government in a firm’s
immediate environment, the more likely the firm is to
engage in political strategies (Baron 1995, Bonardi et al.
2005, Schuler and Rehbein 1997, Schuler et al. 2002).
For example, in the United States, firms in industries rep-
resented by a congressional caucus are more likely to use
lobbying and PAC contributions (Schuler et al. 2002).
Research has begun exploring how corporate politi-
cal strategies may differ in emerging economies where
there is typically a less developed legal and political
infrastructure (e.g., Peng and Heath 1996). Thus far, this
stream of research has mainly focused on the impor-
tance of firm leaders’ personal network ties with the
government (e.g., Li et al. 2006, Wang and Qian 2011).
We expand the research to a broader context, observ-
ing that, on the one hand, government bodies are very
strong and control many economic opportunities, includ-
ing “industry access control, new investment ratification,
value-added tax differentiation, control of pace and pat-
tern of privatization or decentralization, and government
involvement in business activities such as material sourc-
ing, distribution, and marketing” (Luo 2003, p. 1319).
On the other hand, because the rule of law is absent
and there is, in general, an underdeveloped institutional
infrastructure and weak enforcement of existing rules,
it can be hard for firms to know how to interpret and
respond to the government (He and Tian 2008, Marquis
et al. 2011, Peng and Heath 1996). We argue that in
such situations, responding to government signals and
building legitimacy with governmental actors is critical.
The generality of this mechanism of responding to
signals is supported by a deep stream of research in
sociology that has studied how government action in the
United States is as powerful in signaling norms and stan-
dards of legitimacy as it is in formally coercing compli-
ance and has found that variations in how firms respond
to the signals is driven by firm characteristics (Edelman
and Suchman 1997). Regarding the strategic nature of
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such responses, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) pointed out
that firms can comply with public policies or govern-
ment regulations to derive as much value as possible,
including legitimacy. In our study, political legitimacy
is considered a strategic differentiator that firms pur-
sue through multiple channels, depending on their spe-
cific situations. In China, state ownership of some firms
allows us to more effectively distinguish the mechanisms
of government control from the less direct influence
of signaling legitimate action. Most researchers have
focused on the cognitive and normative dimensions of
legitimacy (Scott 2001), but the political bases of legit-
imacy need to be taken into account if one views legit-
imacy as a strategic corporate resource. Thus, although
we focus on an important emerging economy research
site to study this signaling mechanism, we also argue
that this is a general political strategy that firms use
worldwide, based on diverse research that has shown
the importance of government signaling in developed
economies as well.
In our empirical context, we view the Chinese gov-
ernment’s statements and guidelines on CSR and CSR
reporting since 2006 as akin to what Deephouse and
Suchman (2008) refer to as legitimacy guidelines—
signals sent by powerful actors that define appropri-
ate activities for firms. Legitimacy guidelines from the
government, however, provide a puzzle with respect to
which organizations may be most likely to comply. Are
organizations with high legitimacy (e.g., as a result of
government ownership) more susceptible to these legit-
imacy guidelines, or does their status spare them from
having to engage in further legitimacy building? Con-
versely, are firms with lower legitimacy (and hence more
dependent on signaling) more likely to engage in legiti-
macy building in an effort to improve their positions?
Furthermore, as noted previously, the extent to which
corporate relationships with the government create
variations in monitoring will influence the extent and
substance of CSR communications. Given stakeholder
pressure to issue CSR reports, does a firm comply only
symbolically (issuing vague, uninformative reports), or
does it provide substantive details? Developing the idea
of decoupling risk, we contend that organizations that
are closely monitored by external stakeholders are more
likely to engage in more substantive CSR.
Governmental Actors and Political Legitimacy
Our theoretical focus is on how the government influ-
ences corporate action by signaling norms and standards
of legitimacy (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Dobbin et al.
1993; Edelman 1990, 1992). We argue that acting in
accordance with the government’s communicated inter-
ests will afford a firm greater political legitimacy, which,
in turn, gives the firm a greater positional advantage and
less need to conform to government signals than firms
with less political legitimacy.
In many economies, those both emerging and devel-
oped, there is significant government ownership, which
is a key source of legitimacy and provides positional
advantage (Faccio and Lang 2002, La Porta et al. 1999).
This is the case in China, where the government not only
is a key regulator and policymaker but also holds owner-
ship stakes in many firms, both large and small. Some-
times it owns property rights; other times its influence is
less direct. As state-owned ventures have been argued to
“have legitimacy and receive support or even protection
from the government agencies that have founded them”
(Li and Zhang 2007, p. 794), we argue that SOEs have
the most political legitimacy and therefore the least need
to use activities such as CSR reporting to seek preferred
status and associated resources from the government
(Li and Zhang 2007, Ma and Parish 2006). As Brown
(1998, p. 35, italics in original) noted, “Legitimate status
is a sine qua non for easy access to resources, unre-
stricted access to markets, and long term survival.” Firms
lacking such positional advantage, such as privately con-
trolled firms, may be more likely to view political legit-
imacy as a strategic need (Oliver and Holzinger 2008).
Historically, because private owners and entrepreneurs
in China had low social status and were even considered
“enemies” of the people, they experienced discrimina-
tion that SOEs did not (Hong 2004, Huang 2008). Pri-
vately controlled firms, a relatively new organizational
form in China, lack legitimacy in the economy and the
society and therefore have stronger incentives to com-
pensate by cultivating their relationships with the gov-
ernment (Li and Zhang 2007, Peng and Luo 2000).
Thus, although a simple control-oriented perspective
would suggest that SOEs are the firms most likely to
issue CSR reports as a result of coercive pressure from
their government owners, such firms’ inherent political
legitimacy may instead buffer them from the need to
communicate with government stakeholders. Our argu-
ment uncovers an irony in how different types of firms
in China respond to government signals: the govern-
ment articulates CSR reporting guidelines for all compa-
nies, yet our concept of political legitimacy suggests that
such policies will mainly affect those that most need to
enhance their legitimacy, the privately controlled firms.
Indeed, previous research on Chinese firms has found
that privately controlled firms exchange corporate dona-
tions for legitimacy and political access (Hong 2004,
Ma and Parish 2006) and that they benefit more from
their donations in terms of financial performance than
do SOEs (Wang and Qian 2011). Similarly, by issuing
CSR reports, privately controlled firms can create good-
will with government agencies and regulators and thus
gain access to resources that are already easier for SOEs
to obtain. We therefore hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Privately controlled firms are
more likely than other types of firms to issue CSR
reports.
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Political Dependence and CSR Reports
Although it is important to identify the relationship
between government ownership and firm legitimacy,
there are also less direct but no less important mecha-
nisms of influence. We focus on three key factors that we
believe either enhance or reduce a firm’s political depen-
dence and thus its need for political legitimacy; these
are a firm’s (1) political connections to influential gov-
ernment councils, (2) political legacy, and (3) financial
resources. Our hypotheses articulate that these factors
not only are important main effects but also modify the
effect of private ownership on CSR reporting.
Connection to Political Councils. Government pol-
icy and enforcement constitute a major external source
of uncertainty for firms and have been shown to be a
critical influence on operations (Hillman et al. 1999,
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Firms cultivate political
connections to manage the dependencies that constrain
their actions, thus decreasing risk and uncertainty and
increasing access, information, legitimacy, and resources
(Hillman 2005). A firm’s political connections can be
strategic assets (Hillman 2005, Siegel 2007), leading
to preferential treatment by government-owned enter-
prises (such as banks or raw material producers), lighter
taxation, preferential treatment in competition for gov-
ernment contracts, relaxed regulatory oversight of the
company in question, or stiffer regulatory oversight of
its rivals, and many other forms (Faccio 2006, p. 369).
For instance, a study analyzing a sample of 450 polit-
ically connected firms from 35 countries between 1997
and 2002 found that politically connected firms were
significantly more likely to be bailed out from economic
distress than similar but poorly connected firms (Faccio
et al. 2006).
In China, it is quite common for a firm’s leader-
ship to have political connections. The firm’s executives
may not only be members of the Chinese Communist
Party but also hold top positions in the political system
(Ma and Parish 2006). There are generally two types
of political connections. First, corporate executives may
be members of political councils such as the National
People’s Congress (NPC), the only legislative body in
China, or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), an advisory board for the Chinese
government. Second, corporate executives may them-
selves be government officials, for example, bureaucrats
in government agencies. Research has suggested that
the former may have greater symbolic benefit (O’Brien
1990) and the latter greater material benefit (Li and
Zhang 2007, Peng and Luo 2000). The distinct functions
of these two types of political connections have signif-
icant implications for a firm’s political dependence and
its risk of monitoring by the government. In this section,
we consider the symbolic benefit of a firm’s executives
serving on national political councils and how this would
affect CSR reporting. In a subsequent section, we focus
on how a firm’s bureaucratic embeddedness affects the
substantiveness of its CSR reporting.
The NPC and CPPCC are often collectively referred
as the “Two Meetings,” signifying their status as the two
most important political councils in China and the key
means for business leaders to participate in the govern-
ment. Each council meets once a year and serves as
a forum for mediating policy differences between the
Chinese Communist Party and various parts of Chinese
society. Research has suggested that a three- to five-year
membership in either of the councils does more to signal
social prestige than to deliver any immediate business
benefit (O’Brien 1990). The influence of these bodies on
the operating government is quite low, as the Commu-
nist Party and the government still maintain very strong
influence and power over the legislature (Li et al. 2006).
For instance, NPC representatives are welcome to make
suggestions to the government but are forbidden to inter-
vene in legislative and judicial activities (O’Brien 1990).
The CPPCC is even more symbolic as its only func-
tion is advisory; it has no right to participate in the cre-
ation of policies and regulations (Ma and Parish 2006,
Saich 2001).
In the context of CSR reporting, we contend that polit-
ical network connections created by corporate executives
serving on these councils are more likely to lead to firms
responding to government pressure for CSR reporting to
sustain their reputations. By taking action in accordance
with government policies, positions, and regulations—
for example, by issuing CSR reports—firms and their
executives maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the
government. Moreover, it can be harder for executives in
privately controlled firms to become members of these
political councils than it is for executives in SOEs, so the
value of that membership is higher for them. Thus the
impact of these connections on issuing CSR reports may
be particularly important for privately controlled firms,
as responding to policy signals may be one of the few
ways they can show their commitment to government
initiatives. We therefore hypothesize that these connec-
tions also reinforce the previously hypothesized effect of
private control.
Hypothesis 2A (H2A). Firms whose chief executive
officers (CEOs) are members of national political coun-
cils are more likely to issue CSR reports.
Hypothesis 2B (H2B). The effect of private control
on a firm’s CSR reporting will be stronger for firms
whose CEOs are members of national political councils.
Political Legacy. Another key organizational charac-
teristic is how a firm’s founding era creates internal
institutions and connections that result in persistent
commitment to the political system of that era.
Research has theorized that stakeholder relationships are
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path-dependent (Barnett 2007) and has shown that gov-
ernment influence at a firm’s founding imprints the firm
in such a way that its subsequent actions reflect the ini-
tial state policy (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013, Stinchcombe
1965). A growing stream of research on how being
founded in a socialist political environment affects a
firm’s subsequent strategies (Kogut and Zander 2000,
Kriauciunas and Kale 2006) describes such “socialist
imprinting” as a process whereby firm-specific capabili-
ties and knowledge resources are also era-specific. After
market transitions, such capabilities prove to be ill-suited
to the new environment.
Chinese reform has tended toward gradual market
liberalization over the past 30 years, but the change
has accelerated recently. For instance, direct govern-
ment intervention in business has been reduced since
the implementation of the 2004 PRC Administrative
Approval Law, which provides guidelines for govern-
ment activities and protects the interests of Chinese citi-
zens, legal persons, and other interest groups. Thus, it is
likely that older firms have a greater “socialist imprint”
than younger firms and are less likely to pursue recent
trends and management ideas that are inconsistent with
their operating ideologies. Indeed, studies have found
that older Chinese firms have well established structures
and vested interests and are less likely to respond to new
governance practices such as the appointment of out-
side directors; younger firms, by contrast, have stronger
incentives to establish their legitimacy and thus to intro-
duce new governance practices (Peng 2004). Firms
founded when state control of the economy was more
extensive are probably not as attuned to new globally
diffused practices such as CSR reporting and do not feel
as much legitimacy pressure to adopt them.
It would also follow that the effect of private control
on the pursuit of political legitimacy by issuing CSR
reports would be weaker for older privately controlled
firms than for younger firms. These older firms, being
imprinted with legitimacy-seeking strategies prevalent in
the socialist era, would have more difficulty adopting the
newer practices. These arguments lead us to offer the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3A (H3A). Older firms are less likely to
issue CSR reports.
Hypothesis 3B (H3B). The effect of private control
on CSR reporting will be weaker for older firms.
Financial Resources. Research has shown that firms
with greater financial resources are more able to
engage in political activities (Schuler and Rehbein 1997)
and capture a larger portion of the associated ben-
efits (Hillman et al. 2004) and that slack resources
significantly affect corporate social activities such as
philanthropy (Seifert et al. 2004, Waddock and Graves
1997, Wang et al. 2008). Research has also found that
organizations are more likely to follow legitimated prac-
tices to a greater extent if they have greater financial
resources (Park et al. 2011). If the purpose of CSR and
CSR reporting is to gain legitimacy from the govern-
ment, then both higher-performing firms and those with
more slack resources would be more likely to mobilize
those resources to issue CSR reports.
Compared with SOEs, which typically benefit from
government backing and resources, privately controlled
firms’ actions are in general more responsive to changes
in their financial positions. Therefore, we expect a pri-
vately controlled firm’s CSR reporting to be particularly
responsive to its financial resources and, in particular,
expect that greater financial resources would increase the
likelihood of CSR reporting. Moreover, greater financial
resources may create higher external pressure for these
firms to be more transparent and engage in more CSR-
related activities.
Hypothesis 4A (H4A). Firms with greater financial
resources (higher performance and more slack) are
more likely to issue CSR reports.
Hypothesis 4B (H4B). The effect of private control
on CSR reporting will be enhanced for firms with
greater financial resources (higher performance and
more slack).
Government Monitoring and Substantive
CSR Reporting
A firm’s response to its dependence on the gov-
ernment may vary with the likelihood or extent of
government monitoring. One common response is
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977)—the symbolic
compliance with a stakeholder demand without making
substantive changes. For example, a series of studies by
Westphal and Zajac (1994, 1995, 2001) have shown that
firms often respond to stakeholder demands, such as to
issue stock buybacks and create executive incentive pro-
grams, by publicizing actions that they have not actually
taken. In another domain, governments may put pres-
sure on schools to adopt certain standards or curricula,
with little effect on actual teaching processes (Meyer and
Rowan 1978). Decoupling is a useful strategy for firms
because it “enables organizations to maintain standard-
ized, legitimating, formal structures, while their activi-
ties vary in response to practical considerations” (Meyer
and Rowan 1977, p. 357).
Most research on decoupling suggests that because
stakeholders typically do not scrutinize implementation
(Zajac and Westphal 2004), there has been little con-
sideration of what would happen if decoupling were
exposed. However, research on greenwashing, a strategy
similar to decoupling whereby firms overemphasize pos-
itive aspects of their environmental records to mask their
actual performance, suggests that there are significant
risks to this strategy in that stakeholders punish firms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.10
3.1
49
.52
] o
n 2
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
, a
t 0
6:4
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marquis and Qian: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?
134 Organization Science 25(1), pp. 127–148, © 2014 INFORMS
exposed as greenwashers, even if their environmental
performance is better than organizations that do not
greenwash. In one notable case, British Petroleum, hav-
ing touted itself as “Beyond Petroleum,” received more
criticism for its environmental record than did Exxon, a
firm generally considered to have a worse environmen-
tal impact (Lyon and Maxwell 2011). This suggests that
a firm’s information disclosure is sometimes monitored
and that there is a risk of censure if that firm is found
to have engaged in obfuscation or symbolic compliance
rather than having done what it claimed. This perspective
is also consistent with Campbell’s (2007) proposition
that firms are more likely to act in socially responsible
ways when actors such as non-governmental organiza-
tions, social movements, and media monitor their behav-
ior. For example, studies have shown that government
oversight or monitoring leads to higher rates of imple-
mentation of labor provisions (Dobbin et al. 2009), envi-
ronmental self-regulation (Short and Toffel 2010), and
corporate governance codes that are easier to monitor
(Okhmatovskiy and David 2012).
We depart from the traditional decoupling perspective
that suggests implementation is not scrutinized (Zajac
and Westphal 2004), focusing instead on what we term
decoupling risk: how the risk that a firm’s decoupling
will be exposed varies across firms. We expect firms
with higher decoupling risk (i.e., those whose activities
are more likely to be monitored) to be more likely to
engage in substantive CSR reporting. (As mentioned ear-
lier, the high variation in the details of CSR reports
allows us to determine the extent to which those reports
indicate actual CSR activities.2) We hypothesize how
increased monitoring—and therefore increased likeli-
hood of substantial CSR activity—can emerge from two
types of government relation: bureaucratic embedded-
ness and regional government institutional development.
Bureaucratic Embeddedness. As discussed above,
government connections are an important strategy by
which Chinese firms gain access to resources. A firm
can gain great symbolic benefit if its executives attend
the annual meetings of large national congresses such
as the NPC and CPPCC. However, there are other types
of government connections that are more ongoing and
that may expose the firm to more stringent monitor-
ing. In China, executives can hold government positions;
for example, they can be heads of governmental depart-
ments and bureaus (Fan et al. 2007). Such bureaucratic
connections have been shown to confer greater access
to resources or material benefit than do the more sym-
bolic connections to national congresses. For instance,
Peng and Luo (2000) found that managers’ interper-
sonal ties with government officials helped improve their
firms’ performance. Li and Zhang (2007) also found
that new ventures in China rely on government offi-
cials to obtain information and funding that contribute
to performance. Furthermore, firms with such political
connections often have better access to resources critical
for growth (Nee 1992).
Yet, for a number of reasons, such bureaucratic embed-
dedness is also likely to expose a firm to greater gov-
ernment monitoring. First, research has shown that
government agencies and bureaucracies are the key gov-
ernment areas responsible for policy implementation.
This leads to greater organizational oversight (Bonardi
et al. 2006, Hiatt and Park 2013). Second, such con-
nections are more ongoing and involve closer connec-
tions with the government. For instance, Dickson (2003)
argued that including top business leaders in the bureau-
cracy is a means of co-opting them, giving the govern-
ment another form of informal control over the economy.
Existing CEOs can be recruited into the government.
Furthermore, the Chinese government may appoint or
encourage government officials to become executives or
directors of firms in order to gain more control over
those firms (Fan et al. 2007). Whereas firms may cre-
ate or maintain bureaucratic ties for increased access to
resources, these ties are also likely to subject the firm
to greater scrutiny, in turn making the firm more likely to
engage in substantial CSR practices (Dickson 2003). We
therefore hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 5. Firms whose leaders hold positions as
government officials will be more likely to engage in
more substantive CSR reporting.
Regional Government Institutional Development.
Prior research on the relationship between a firm’s insti-
tutional environment and the political strategies it adopts
in response has typically emphasized the importance of
institutional differences at the federal or central levels
(Hillman et al. 2004), with limited attention to how vari-
ations within a country affects firms’ political strategies.
Yet the latter perspective is particularly important in
emerging economies such as China, where the unde-
veloped institutional infrastructure creates challenges for
firms (Young et al. 2008). During the reform period,
there have been significant variations across China in
the extent to which regional governments have seized
the opportunity to use market mechanisms to develop the
local economy, enhance fiscal health, and, correspond-
ingly, enhance development of regional government
institutions. The fiscal reforms of the 1980s gave certain
economic rights and responsibilities to each government
jurisdiction above the village level, thus increasing local
and provincial government revenues (Walder 1995).3 As
a result, governments in developed regions have accu-
mulated significant financial resources and have intro-
duced more advanced management techniques, making
them more likely to have not only the resources but also
the expertise to monitor corporate activities (Brandt and
Li 2003, Goldstein 1995). We therefore hypothesize the
following.
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Hypothesis 6. Firms headquartered in more institu-
tionally developed regions will be more likely to engage
in more substantive CSR reporting.
Methods and Analyses
Data and Sample
This study covers all Chinese firms that were listed
on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges from
2006 to 2009. Data sources include archival data from
the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database, firms’ annual reports and CSR
reports, the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
and CSR report ratings from the CSR rating agency
Runling (also known by its English acronym, RKS;
http://www.rksratings.com). CSMAR is the primary
source for information on Chinese stock markets and
the financial statements of Chinese listed firms. Corpo-
rate annual reports provide a biographical sketch of the
CEO, including his or her previous experience in indus-
try and government (Fan et al. 2007). CSR reports were
also downloaded from firm and stock exchange websites.
Our ratings of the substance of a firm’s CSR report are
from RKS and cover 2008 and 2009. We complement
that information with provincial-level development data
from the Chinese Statistics Bureau. After merging these
databases and removing observations that were missing
key explanatory variables (about 6%), we have a sample
of 5,660 firm-year observations. There is a one-year lag
between all independent and dependent variables.
Measures
Dependent Variables. Our main foci in this study are
the factors that would affect (a) whether a firm issues
a CSR report and (b) the substance of CSR activities
depicted in the report. Thus, we have two dependent
variables. CSR report is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the focal firm has issued a CSR report in a given year,
and it is 0 otherwise. In our sample, the number of CSR
reports issued by Chinese public firms increased year
after year (see Figure 2).
CSR reporting substantiveness is an overall rating of
CSR activities as portrayed in the report. We obtained
these ratings from the RKS, whose organization and
China-specific products are modeled after the U.S. social
investment rating agency Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini &
Co., Inc. (KLD). Like KLD, RKS is entirely independent
of the companies it rates. Because what it rates is firms’
activities as presented in their CSR reports, the data
it gathers are from those reports as well as other firm
communications such as websites and press releases.
Firms’ CSR activities are rated along three dimensions:
(1) overall evaluation includes a firm’s CSR strategy, the
extent of stakeholder participation in CSR activities, the
comparability of report information over time, the inno-
vativeness of the firm’s CSR activities, and the extent of
external auditing; (2) content evaluation focuses on the
extent of leadership and organizational systems in place
for implementing CSR and on specific metrics for eco-
nomic, environmental, and social responsibilities; and
(3) technical evaluation focuses on items such as the
transparency, regularity, and availability of CSR infor-
mation. These three dimensions together include over 70
subdimensions (the list is available from the authors).
The rating ranges from 0 to 100. This evaluation sys-
tem is based on the GRI 3.0 guidelines, which RKS
adapted for use in China by adding China-specific CSR
elements. For example, Chinese firms frequently publi-
cize the amount of taxes they pay to the government as a
form of social responsibility, which RKS captures. Each
CSR report is evaluated by at least three RKS experts,
each with at least three years of CSR experience and no
conflicts of interests involving the focal firm.
Given our interest in assessing the extent to which
CSR reporting reflects a greater degree of substantive
CSR activity, an alternative to the RKS composite
measure (all three dimensions) would be to take into
account only the overall evaluation and content evalu-
ation dimensions. We conducted supplementary analy-
ses with this alternative dependent variable as well as a
number of other robustness checks4 and always achieved
the same results (results available from the authors on
request).
Independent Variables. Two sets of independent vari-
ables were used to test the hypotheses predicting the
two dependent variables. For the analysis of the CSR
report, we used the following independent variables: pri-
vate control is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
was owned by dispersed private shareholders and 0 if
the ultimate owner was the Chinese government and its
agencies (Wang et al. 2008).5 CEO NPC/CPPCC mem-
bership is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO was
a member of the CPCC, and 0 otherwise.6
Firm age is the number of years since the firm was
established. Financial resources were captured by two
variables: firm ROA is the return on assets calculated
as net income over total assets, a common accounting-
based measure of financial performance. ROA is seen
as the best performance measure to use in China (Peng
and Luo 2000). Seifert et al. (2004) argued that cash
flow better captures the notion of available resources
for discretionary purposes. Thus, we calculated slack
resources as the sum of cash flow from a firm’s oper-
ating, financing, and investing activities. To control for
firm size, we scaled slack resources by total assets
(Carow et al. 2004).
For the analysis of CSR reporting substantiveness, we
used the following independent variables: CEO as gov-
ernment official is a dummy variable used to measure
bureaucratic embeddedness. It equals 1 when the CEO
is or has been an officer of the central or regional gov-
ernments, and it is 0 otherwise (Bai et al. 2006, Li
et al. 2006). As noted, we expect that firms in regions of
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China with more developed governments will issue more
substantive CSR reports. We measure regional institu-
tional development as a province’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita (i.e., the province’s GDP divided
by its population), which we obtained from the Chinese
Statistics Bureau. This is consistent with prior research
showing that economic development is highly related to
government development in China (Walder 1995).
Control Variables. We controlled for additional vari-
ables that may affect either a firm’s decision to issue a
CSR report or the report’s substantiveness.
Because larger firms may have more staff and infras-
tructure with which to issue CSR reports or to provide
greater substance, we include firm size, the natural log
of a firm’s total assets.
Stock market regulations require some firms to pro-
duce CSR reports. For instance, in May 2008, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange issued a policy requiring firms
in the corporate governance group,7 firms listed on for-
eign stock exchanges such as New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), and
firms in financial industries to issue CSR reports. In the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, firms belonging to the SZSE
100 Index are required to issue CSR reports. We there-
fore include required discloser, a dummy variable equal
to 1 if a firm’s characteristics suggest it would be
required to issue a CSR report in a given year and 0
otherwise.8
We expect that highly visible firms will be more
likely to disclose CSR reports and that their reports
will be more substantive. We chose five newspapers—
People’s Daily, the International Finance News, the
Market News, the Jinghua News, and the Jiangnan
News—for their prevalence in and relevance to firm
economic activities. We used a website search engine
(http://www.search.people.com.cn) to assign a value to
media exposure, the number of news articles about a
focal firm in a given year.
Because firms with experience issuing CSR reports
may be more likely to do so in a given year and to do
so more substantively, we also controlled for reporting
experience, which is equal to 1 if the focal firm has
issued a CSR report before and 0 otherwise.9
To the extent that Chinese firms are becoming global,
they may be exposed to additional pressures regarding
reporting and transparency (KPMG 2008). We there-
fore controlled for foreign sales and international expo-
sure as measures of the pressure a firm faces from the
international market. Foreign sales is the firm’s foreign
sales as a percentage of total sales (Hitt et al. 1997).
International stockholders is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if a firm is cross-listed in international stock mar-
ket exchanges such as HKSE and NYSE or has issued
B-shares to foreign investors. These two variables are
important to control for the extent to which international
pressure drives a firm’s CSR reporting.
Because there could be a difference between firms
listed in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges,
we included a dummy variable, stock market exchange,
which is equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange and 0 if it is listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange.
There is a significant variation in the extent of CSR
reporting across the years of our study (2006–2009).
To control for a potential time effect, we included year
dummy variables in the analysis. Furthermore, to con-
trol for possible differences in CSR reporting across
industries, which may be under pressure from different
sources, we included 12 industry dummies represent-
ing the 13 industry categories10 identified by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission.11
Predictors of CSR Reporting Substantiveness. To con-
trol for the fact that stakeholder monitoring might affect
the probability of issuing a CSR report, we also included
the key predictors of CSR reporting substantiveness,
CEO as government official and regional institutional
development, as control variables when predicting the
probability of a CSR report.
Estimation Method
We used a different method to test each of our two
predictions.12 The first analysis involved estimating the
probability of a firm issuing a CSR report by applying
a logit model to the entire sample of 5,660 firm-year
observations. We then used ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression to examine the relationship between moni-
toring and substantive CSR reporting. The sample was
limited to firms whose CSR reports had been rated by
RKS, which resulted in 791 observations.13 To con-
trol for multiple observations per firm and for any
potential heteroskedasticity, we report cluster-adjusted
and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in both our
analyses. We conducted our statistical analysis using
Stata 11.1.
Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations
for each of our variables. Panel A includes the variables
used in the logit model to predict the probability of a
firm issuing a CSR report; panel B includes the variables
used in the OLS regression to predict the substantive-
ness of CSR reporting. Because in this analysis there are
significant intercorrelations among some variables, we
computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) to investigate
whether there was a potential multicollinearity problem.
The maximum VIF obtained in any of the models was
2.4 (firm size); the mean VIF was 1.3, below the rule-
of-thumb cutoff of 10 (Ryan 1997). Therefore, we do
not believe that multicollinearity significantly affects our
results.
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Table 3 Estimates from Logistic Regression of Firm CSR Report Probability (CSR Report = 1), 2006–2009
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Organizational and environmental controls
Firm size 00533∗∗∗ 00542∗∗∗ 00530∗∗∗ 00531∗∗∗ 00541∗∗∗ 00539∗∗∗ 00548∗∗∗
4000555 4000565 4000575 4000575 4000575 4000585 4000585
Required discloser (yes = 1) 20859∗∗∗ 20863∗∗∗ 20844∗∗∗ 20845∗∗∗ 20846∗∗∗ 20832∗∗∗ 20835∗∗∗
4001785 4001785 4001785 4001785 4001795 4001785 4001795
Media exposure 00013∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗
4000045 4000045 4000045 4000045 4000045 4000045 4000045
Reporting experience 30711∗∗∗ 30704∗∗∗ 30686∗∗∗ 30688∗∗∗ 30666∗∗∗ 30701∗∗∗ 30679∗∗∗
4006605 4006605 4006585 4006585 4006645 4006585 4006625
Foreign sales 00005+ 00005+ 00004 00004 00004 00004 00004
4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035
International stockholders −00326 −00319 −00219 −00221 −00235 −00229 −00244
4002015 4002025 4002025 4002025 4002025 4002035 4002035
Stock market exchange (Shenzhen = 1) 00233∗ 00241∗ 00282∗ 00282∗ 00304∗∗ 00282∗ 00301∗∗
4001145 4001145 4001155 4001155 4001155 4001155 4001155
CEO as government official 00117 00121 00076 00079 00074 00072 00073
4001575 4001585 4001575 4001575 4001575 4001575 4001575
Regional development 00037 00031 −00004 −00003 −00025 −00008 −00024
4001075 4001085 4001075 4001075 4001105 4001085 4001095
Sociopolitical legitimacy and dependence controls
H1: Private control (yes = 1) 00098 00021 00005 00666+ −00090 00465
4001325 4001335 4001385 4003545 4001455 4003645
H2A: CEO NPC/CPPCC membership 00506∗ 00362 00517∗ 00503∗ 00385
4002595 4003675 4002585 4002585 4003685
H3A: Firm age −00037∗ −00038∗ −00013 −00036∗ −00016
4000165 4000165 4000215 4000165 4000215
H4A: Firm ROA 90328∗∗∗ 90333∗∗∗ 90565∗∗∗ 80468∗∗∗ 80824∗∗∗
4105925 4105945 4106325 4109845 4200295
H4A: Slack resources 10168∗ 10163∗ 10081∗ 00099 00129
4004965 4004975 4004895 4006915 4006995
H2B: Private control× 00263 00229
CEO NPC/CPPCC membership 4005125 4005515
H3B: Private control×Firm age −00059∗ −00051+
4000315 4000315
H4B: Private control×ROA 20451 20054
4208435 4208495
H4B: Private control×Slack resources 20234∗ 10971∗
4009755 4009655
Constant −140117∗∗∗ −140315∗∗∗ −130152∗∗∗ −130176∗∗∗ −130432∗∗∗ −130253∗∗∗ −130502∗∗∗
4105915 4106115 4101655 4106445 4106575 4106555 4106615
No. of observations 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660
Pseudo R2 00387 00387 00399 00399 00400 00401 00401
Log pseudo-likelihood −11512082 −11512041 −11482035 −11482017 −11479063 −11479038 −11477025
Wald 2 726050 735094 701000 701046 698057 700064 699077
(24)∗∗∗ (25)∗∗∗ (29)∗∗∗ (30)∗∗∗ (30)∗∗∗ (31)∗∗∗ (33)∗∗∗
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year and industry dummies are included but not reported here.
+p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001 (two-tailed test).
Table 3 presents the logistic regression estimates of
the probability of a firm issuing a CSR report. Model 1
included all the organizational and environmental con-
trol variables. Firm size, required discloser, reporting
experience, media exposure, and stock market exchange
all had significant influence on the probability of issuing
a CSR report.
Models 2–7 tested the hypotheses. In Model 2, the
coefficient of private control was positive as predicted
but below marginal significance. Hypothesis 1 was there-
fore not supported. Hypotheses 2A and 2B stated that
firms whose CEOs are members of national political
councils would be more likely to issue CSR reports and
that this would strengthen the effect of private control on
CSR reporting. In Model 3, the main effect of CEOs as
political council members was positive and significant,
supporting Hypothesis 2A. When holding other variables
at their mean, the probability of issuing a CSR report is
3.49% higher for firms with CEOs who are members of
the NPC or CPPCC than the probability for firms with-
out such connections. However, in Model 4, the interac-
tion term between CEO NPC/CPPCC membership and
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private control was not significant; Hypothesis 2B there-
fore was not supported.
Hypotheses 3A and 3B predicted that older firms are
less likely to issue CSR reports and that the positive
impact of private control will be weakened for older
firms. In Model 3, firm age was negatively related to
the probability of CSR reporting (p < 0001), support-
ing Hypothesis 3A. A one-standard-deviation increase
in firm age decreases the probability of issuing a CSR
report by 8.1%. In Model 5, firm age negatively inter-
acted with private control (p < 0005), lending support to
Hypothesis 3B.
Hypotheses 4A and 4B predicted that a firm’s financial
resources, measured as firm ROA and slack resources,
would positively affect the probability of CSR reporting
and would also moderate the impact of private control on
the probability of CSR reporting. In Model 3, both firm
ROA and slack resources positively affected CSR report-
ing (at p < 00001 and p < 0005, respectively), provid-
ing support for Hypothesis 4A. A one-standard-deviation
increase in firm ROA increases the probability of issuing
a CSR report by 8.41% (from 6.18% to 14.59%); the
same increase in slack resources increases the probabil-
ity by 6.30%. In Model 6, the interaction term between
private control and firm ROA was not statistically sig-
nificant, but the interaction term between private control
and slack resources was positive and significant (p <
0005). This provided partial support for Hypothesis 4B:
privately controlled companies with high discretionary
cash flow are more likely to issue CSR reports than are
SOEs with similar resources. Model 7 included all the
main effects and the interactions; the results were largely
consistent with those of the reduced models.
Because we are testing interaction effects in a logit
model, it is important to acknowledge the controversy
regarding the validity of computing and interpreting sta-
tistically significant interactions in these models (Hoetker
2007, Norton et al. 2004). In presenting our results,
we follow Greene’s (2010) suggestion that researchers
should conduct hypothesis testing on their model and
not on predicted values. We thus present our interpreta-
tions based on our model and provide visualizations for
interpretation, using the standard Aiken and West (1991)
approach to plot the significant interactions. Furthermore,
we have conducted robustness checks using the Stata int-
eff procedure (Norton et al. 2004) to verify that our infer-
ences based on the interaction coefficients are valid.14
The interaction effects between private control and firm
age and between private control and slack resources are
shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively; the patterns are
consistent with our predictions.
Table 4 presents the OLS regression model of CSR
reporting substantiveness. Model 1 included all the orga-
nizational and environmental controls. Models 2–4 tested
the predictions of Hypotheses 5 and 6. Hypothesis 5 pre-
dicted that firms with leaders with experience in govern-
ment bureaus are more likely to engage in substantive
Figure 3 Interaction Effect Between Private Control and Firm
Age on CSR Reporting
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CSR reporting. In Model 2, the effect of having a CEO
who is or has been a government official was marginally
significant (p < 0010), partially supporting Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the level of government insti-
tutional development of the region in which the firm is
headquartered would positively affect substantive CSR
reporting. In Model 3, the effect of regional development
was positively significant (p < 0005), supporting Hypoth-
esis 6. Everything else being equal, a one-unit increase
in regional development will increase the substantiveness
of CSR reports by 13%. The results were the same in
Model 4, which included both independent variables.
It is worth noting that the control variables return
results that are highly consistent with our theory. In the
analyses examining CSR reporting probability, neither
Figure 4 Interaction Effect Between Private Control and Firm
Slack Resources on CSR Reporting
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Table 4 Estimates from OLS Regression of CSR Reporting Substantiveness
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Organizational and environmental controls
Firm size 20927∗∗∗ 20996∗∗∗ 20819∗∗∗ 20889∗∗∗
4004415 4004465 4004395 4004455
Required discloser (yes = 1) 10468 10457 10484 10476
4009295 4009245 4009385 4009335
Media exposure −00011 −00014 −00008 −00011
4000305 4000315 4000305 4000315
Reporting experience 30444+ 30535+ 30335+ 30427+
4109125 4109085 4108825 4108775
Foreign sales 00004 00006 00002 00004
4000185 4000185 4000185 4000185
International stockholders 30132+ 30130+ 20799 20792
4107285 4107295 4107345 4107365
Private control (yes = 1) 00362 00485 00159 00320
4009345 4009275 4009335 4009275
CEO NPC/CPPCC membership 10228 00818 10321 00907
4102905 4103115 4102885 4102995
Firm age −00215∗ −00225∗ −00199+ −00207+
4001095 4001105 4001105 4001115
Firm ROA 40272 00679 30256 00420
41008235 41101955 41009325 41102675
Slack resources 20725 20493 20730 20514
4205635 4205515 4205365 4205315
Sociopolitical monitoring controls
CEO as government official 10738+ 10761+
4100155 4100145
Regional institutional development 10532∗ 10553∗
4007675 4007625
Constant 320309∗∗∗ −340538∗∗∗ −450337∗∗∗ −470816∗∗∗
4907995 4908775 41203355 41204355
No. of observations 791 791 791 791
F -value 12053 10058 10027 9093
R2 00377 00380 00382 00385
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year and industry dummies are included but not reported here.
+p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001 (two-tailed test).
regional institutional development nor CEO as govern-
ment official—the key predictors in the analyses of
reporting substantiveness—was significant. These results
reinforce the idea that these firms are aware that they
may be under additional scrutiny and therefore issue
reports only when they can engage in substantive CSR
practices.
Alternatively, factors that significantly affected the
likelihood of CSR reporting probability, such as firm
ROA, slack resources, and CEO NPC/CPPCC member-
ship, had no effect on the substantiveness of report-
ing. Also consistent with this pattern, required discloser
and media exposure had positive impacts on issuing
reports but had no effect on the reports’ substantiveness.
It may be that these factors exert pressure on a firm
in such a way that they are more likely to engage in
symbolic reporting. Comparing these results across mod-
els gives us confidence that firms engage in both sym-
bolic and substantive reporting and that our theoretical
model helps unpack the processes that lead to one or
the other.
It is important to note as well that we controlled for
other potential economic or market pressures not only
to ensure that our theorized effects are net of alter-
native explanations but also to strengthen our claim
that the government processes we established are the
key relationships in this context. Neither the industry
dummy variables we included (results available from the
authors on request) nor the two measures of international
pressure, foreign sales and international stockholders,
were significant. Regarding this last set of controls, as
noted, a plausible alternative set of pressures is the
extent to which globalizing Chinese firms are exposed
to international standards of CSR reporting and trans-
parency (KPMG 2008). However, in accordance with our
original hypotheses, our results show that it is not these
factors that drive CSR decisions but factors related to
firms’ exposure to the domestic government.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study focused on how and why firms strategically
respond to government signals on CSR. Our results point
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to a complex process, with several factors influencing
political dependency, which in turn affects the likeli-
hood that a firm will comply with government signals by
issuing CSR reports. Our emerging market context, i.e.,
a country whose government is a substantial owner of
many firms, allowed us to differentiate between govern-
ment relations focused on control versus those focused
on a firm’s quest for greater legitimacy. We found that
a number of variables that proxy firm dependence on
the government—including CEO membership in polit-
ical councils (the NPC or CPPCC), political legacy,
and financial resources—all affect its legitimacy posi-
tion and, correspondingly, the likelihood of issuing a
CSR report. Although our findings on the main effect of
private control were not statistically significant, a num-
ber of the other political factors tested did moderate the
effect of private control on reporting, suggesting that a
firm’s response to government signals is not a simple
process. Firms face many different pressures depending
on their characteristics. One unique feature of China is
that there are also strong pressures from the government
on some SOEs to be global exemplars (Marquis et al.
2011). Thus, a key conclusion of our research is that
the effects of government legitimacy pressures cannot be
accurately identified without fully understanding how a
firm’s background, situation, and position affect its polit-
ical dependence. We encourage future research to better
understand the contingencies that affect firms’ political
dependence and associated pressures.
In addition to examining the issuance of a CSR report,
which can be seen as primarily a symbolic act, we also
examined the extent to which the likelihood of gov-
ernment monitoring leads firms to produce reports with
greater substantive content. Here, we found that another
type of government pressure, i.e., bureaucratic embed-
dedness (whether the CEO has experience as a govern-
ment official), was a significant predictor of substantive
CSR reporting. We believe this is because such ties,
being much tighter than the more symbolic memberships
in political councils, expose the firm to greater monitor-
ing. A firm’s location in an area with greater government
institutional development also predicts more substantive
CSR reporting. It is important to note that the factors
that lead a firm to be more substantive in its reporting
did not significantly affect the firm’s likelihood of issu-
ing a report. This suggests that such firms are aware that
their political position brings them additional scrutiny
and therefore only issue a report when they can issue a
substantive one.
As we detail below, we believe these findings offer
broader contributions to research on both corporate polit-
ical strategy and institutional theory.
Contributions to Research on
Corporate Political Strategy
Whereas much prior research has focused on the
important mechanisms of corporate political strategy in
Western contexts (e.g., Hillman 2003), researchers are
now focusing more on comparing and contrasting that
corporate political strategy with those in emerging mar-
kets such as China (He and Tian 2008, Tian et al. 2009).
Corporate political strategy is “not only important to bet-
ter understanding firms’ competitive strategies in more
transparent developed nations but is particularly impor-
tant to understanding the relationship-based strategies
needed in developing countries” (Pearce et al. 2008,
p. 494). Our setting provides a novel context in which
to uncover these political processes and to illustrate an
intriguing paradox in the Chinese government’s control
of firms. As a substantial owner of SOEs, the govern-
ment issues guidelines for such enterprises, so one might
expect SOEs to be on the vanguard of implementing new
policies. But, in fact, our study of legitimacy and depen-
dence argues that such signals are more likely to be
followed by privately controlled firms, which our inter-
action effect results support. We have taken advantage
of China’s unique characteristics to better understand
government signaling and how a firm’s characteristics
influence its response to signaling. We concur with
Tsui (2007) that such research is crucial to developing
more general, nuanced management theory that is capa-
ble of understanding organizational behavior across the
globe.
Correspondingly, the focus on strategic response to
government signals resonates clearly with more general
institutional research showing that a key form of gov-
ernment influence on corporate action is the creation
of legitimacy norms that signal government goals and
interests (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Dobbin et al. 1993;
Edelman 1990, 1992). At a general level, one contribu-
tion of our paper is joining research on corporate politi-
cal strategy (e.g., Hillman 2003, Hillman et al. 2004) and
institutional research, thus identifying an important and
insufficiently studied mechanism of corporate political
strategy, i.e., adherence to government signals on politi-
cally legitimate behavior. We encourage future research
on this topic to better understand the variety of politi-
cal signals and corporate responses across the globe and
how these interacting mechanisms have changed over
time.
A second contribution of our paper is to unpack the
implications of different types of political relationships
(Hillman 2005, Siegel 2007) for firms’ responses to gov-
ernment pressure. The main point of prior research is
that firms acquire a variety of benefits (i.e., information,
access, influence, and reduced uncertainty and transac-
tion costs; see Faccio 2006, Hillman 2005) through their
connections with the government. In our study, some
types of connections, such as membership in the NPC
or CPPCC, are more symbolic than others, and we find
that they are more likely to result in correspondingly
symbolic compliance. Bureaucratic embeddedness, how-
ever, may result in closer monitoring by the govern-
ment, making firms more likely to engage in substantive
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CSR activity. Bureaucratic connections may thus be a
double-edged sword. Whereas research has shown them
to be essential for access to resources in China (Fan
et al. 2007), this may come at the expense of addi-
tional government scrutiny. We also found evidence of
a political imprinting process such that older firms, pre-
sumably more influenced by the earlier socialist system,
were less likely to pursue CSR reporting as a political
strategy.
Whereas these contributions highlight the benefits of
studying this context (Tsui 2007), we also acknowl-
edge a number of idiosyncrasies of the Chinese polit-
ical system that may limit the generalizability of our
results. Government–firm relations may be more impor-
tant in China than in other countries (Farashahi and
Hafsi 2009, Guthrie 2009) and more likely to reflect
decoupling (Marquis et al. 2011). Studies have doc-
umented the importance of corporate political ties in
other Asian countries (Siegel 2007) and in the United
States (e.g., Hillman et al. 1999), but it would be
worthwhile to examine whether our specific findings
hold elsewhere. As companies globalize, understanding
the variation in political mechanisms is an important
research endeavor both for organizational theory and for
managerial practice.
Contributions to Institutional Theory
Our research also makes important contributions to insti-
tutional theory. First, as discussed above, government
signals shape definitions of legitimacy, and specific
firms’ responses to those signals are shaped by their
dependence on the government and the likelihood of
government monitoring. Regarding the latter, our identi-
fication of decoupling risk is an important contribution
to understanding how and when firms adopt a sym-
bolic strategy in response to external demands. Research
has identified a decoupling gap in a variety of settings,
including school curricula (Meyer and Rowan 1978),
social movement communications (Elsbach and Sutton
1992), and corporate strategies (Westphal and Zajac
1994, 2001), but it has given much less consideration
to the causes of organization-level variation in decou-
pling (Scott 2008). Contrary to research suggesting that
firms’ symbolic strategies are not monitored (Zajac and
Westphal 2004), our results suggest that firms know they
face a risk in decoupling and are less likely to do so
the more likely they are to be monitored. Whereas ear-
lier work suggested variation in decoupling based on
internal firm characteristics such as CEO power and
board composition (Westphal and Zajac 2001), our find-
ings suggest variations based on the closeness of the
firm’s relationship with the government and on the level
of government monitoring associated with that relation-
ship. We believe it is consequential that a number of
firm characteristics, including our hypothesized effects
of bureaucratic embeddedness and regional government
development, lead firms to be more substantive in their
reporting while having no effect on the likelihood that
they will issue a report in the first place. It is likely that
these firms perceive that, if they do issue a report, they
will be exposed to greater monitoring, so the report had
better be substantive.
Our framing of this second stage of our analyses
focused on the substantiveness of CSR reporting. We
acknowledge that a more detailed test of the substantive-
ness of CSR activities would be gained by examining the
activities themselves. Yet, based on our supplementary
analyses, discussions with consultants, and spot-checking
of the highest- and lowest-rated CSR reports, there are
strong indications of a high level of agreement between a
firm issuing more substantive reports and actually enact-
ing CSR practices. To prove this connection more con-
cretely, future research may endeavor to collect data on
CSR activities directly. Furthermore, we acknowledge
that because of data constraints in our analysis of report-
ing substantiveness, we could only examine two years
of activity, which limited our statistical power. This may
have resulted in weaker findings than if we had had more
years of data, so we encourage future research on this
topic in other settings free of this constraint.
In conclusion, we believe that introducing our idea of
decoupling risk (and associated monitoring processes) to
the increasingly important area of CSR reporting may
have the practical benefit of highlighting an important
pathway by which firms can be encouraged to act mean-
ingfully in accordance with their purported corporate
responsibility. Over the past 15 years, the number of
global firms issuing CSR and sustainability reports has
increased from virtually none to over 3,000 (Eccles and
Krzus 2010). Yet such reporting has been criticized as
a sophisticated version of greenwashing or “pinkwash-
ing” (i.e., spreading a veneer of disclosure over a lack
of actual CSR activity). CSR itself has been criticized
as mostly “myth and ceremony” with little actual sub-
stance (Lyon and Maxwell 2011). Although our results
support the idea that some CSR activity may be sym-
bolic, they also suggest that increased monitoring will
lead firms to truly be more socially and environmentally
responsible.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Major Government Communications Regarding Corporate Social Responsibility Activities and Reporting, 2006–2011
Guide/standard Date Issuing organization Key content
1. China corporate social
responsibility
recommended
standard and best
practice
September 2006 China Business
Council for
Sustainable
Development
The standard aims to build the capability for social responsibility
of Chinese enterprises and provide the recommended
standards and practices to Chinese enterprises for
references. The standard and practices include normative
suggestions (meaning that Chinese enterprises are strongly
“encouraged” to obey them).
2. CSR Guide for
companies listed on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
September 2006 Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
It clearly encourages listed firms to issue social responsibility
reports. The guide particularly encourages firms that may
have safety accidents, such as firms in the biotech industry,
high-pollution industries, mining, construction, etc., to issue
CSR reports. It states that the most urgent task is to build CSR
laws and regulations for firms to follow.
3. Guide on social
responsibility of listed
companies
September 2006 Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
As the third stock exchange in the world that issues a corporate
social responsibility guide, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
encourages listed companies to follow the social responsibility
systems outlined in the guide, and it also suggests that those
companies issue corporate social responsibility reports along
with their annual reports. The guide requires that CSR reports
of listed companies include the following: implementation of
social responsibility as it pertains to employee protection,
environmental pollution, product quality, and the community;
and disclosure of any gap between the company’s CSR and
the guide’s requirements. The guide emphasizes the
importance of shareholders, employees, customers, and
environmental protection.
4. Decisions by the
Central Committee of
the CPC on some
major issues in building
a harmonious socialist
society
October 2006 The 6th Plenum of
the 16th CPC
Central
Committee
It clearly states that to build a harmonious society, China should
increase the social responsibility of the citizens, business
enterprises, and all kinds of other organizations.
5. Opinions of the general
office of the China
Banking Regulatory
Commission on
strengthening the
social responsibility of
banking financial
institutions
May 2007 China Banking
Regulatory
Commission
It aims to increase banking/financial institutions’ sense of social
responsibility. It states that banking/financial institutions’
fulfillment of their social responsibility is a must for building a
harmonious society. Social responsibility is a product of the
in-depth development of economic globalization, and it
represents the values, language, and code of conduct
commonly recognized by the governments, enterprises, and
other institutions of all countries for realizing coordinated
economic and social development in the course of
globalization. The socialist market economy, sustainable
economic development, and social progress of China all
depend on enterprises increasing their sense of social
responsibility.
6. Guidelines to
state-owned
enterprises directly
under the central
government on fulfilling
corporate social
responsibilities
January 2008 State-owned Assets
Supervision and
Administration
Commission
These guidelines are proposed to comprehensively implement
the spirit of the 17th CPC National Congress and the Scientific
Outlook on Development and give the impetus to SOEs
directly under the central government to earnestly fulfill
corporate social responsibilities so as to realize a coordinated
and sustainable development of enterprises, society, and the
environment in all respects. Fulfilling CSRs is a practical
action taken by central SOEs to apply the Scientific Outlook
on Development and is an overall social requirement for
central SOEs. CSR reports must be fulfilled by central SOEs to
realize sustainable development and to participate in
international economic cooperation.
7. Guide on social
responsibility for
Chinese business
enterprises and
associations
April 2008 All-China
Federation of
Industrial
Economics
It includes 80 criteria for corporate social responsibility in
categories such as energy, environmental protection,
production safety, product safety, employee protection, and
protection of disadvantaged social groups. It encourages
business enterprises to actively involve themselves in CSR
activities.
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Table A.1. (cont’d)
Guide/standard Date Issuing organization Key content
8. Notice on
strengthening listed
companies
undertaking social
responsibilities
May 2008 Shanghai Stock
Exchange
It first raised the concept of “social value per share,” which is
an overall evaluation of company value from a new
perspective.
9. Guidelines of the
Shanghai Stock
Exchange for
environmental
information disclosure
of listed companies
May 2008 Shanghai Stock
Exchange
The guidelines encourage listed companies to issue CSR
reports and actively engage in social responsibility activities.
Companies that are performing well in social responsibility
will be given first priority to be included in the Shanghai
Stock Exchange corporate governance sector, which is an
indicator of good corporate governance of the firm.
10. Guide on
implementation of
corporate social
responsibility among
foreign-funded
enterprises (draft)
September 2008 Ministry of
Commerce
The guide aims to encourage foreign-funded enterprises to
better carry out social responsibility, increase
competitiveness, and achieve sustainable development.
According to the guide, the social responsibilities for
foreign-funded enterprises include (1) abiding by laws,
regulations, and business ethics to meet enterprise
operation requirements; (2) meeting the goals and
requirements of relevant persons of interest (e.g., generating
values for shareholders; creating better labor, life, and
development conditions for employees; paying taxes and
establishing a healthy and natural environment for
communities); and (3) contributing to the social public good.
11. Circular on properly
handling the 2008
annual reports of listed
companies
December 2008 Shanghai Stock
Exchange
According to this circular, three types of firms are required to
issue CSR reports: firms in the “corporate governance
group,” firms listed in foreign stock exchanges, and firms in
financial industries.
12. Guideline for the
preparation of the
report on performance
of CSR
January 2009 Shanghai Stock
Exchange
It states the rules of preparation for CSR reports in social,
environmental, and economic sustainable development
contexts. The rules are consistent with the international
standard GRI 3.0 in structure.
13. Application
Guidelines for
Enterprise Internal
Control No. 4—Social
Responsibilities
May 2010 Accountancy
Department of
the Ministry of
Finance
The guidelines state that corporate social responsibility
includes items such as safety production, product quality,
environmental protection, resource saving, a high
employment rate, and protection of employee rights.
14. Opinions on
encouraging industrial
enterprises to engage
in social
responsibilities
May 2011 All-China
Federation of
Industrial
Economics
It aims to strengthen the social responsibility of industrial
enterprises and improve the social awareness of industrial
enterprises at the national level.
15. Charity development
guide platform
(2011–2015)
July 2011 Ministry of Civil
Affairs
“China will encourage more transparency in its charitable
organizations over the next five years by increasing the
amount of data it publishes on the organizations and inviting
the public to supervise them. 0 0 0 In its five-year guideline for
the development of China’s charitable organizations, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs said that transparency will be a ‘basic
principle’ in developing charity work while promising to
respect the will of donors. 0 0 0 To lend credibility to charitable
organizations, information regarding the management and
use of donations will be published and subject to
supervision from both the government and the public,
according to the guideline. Donors will be able to decide for
themselves the size of their donations and how they want to
have their donations used, the guideline said. In addition,
donors from overseas will be allowed to have import tariffs or
value-added taxes cut or exempted in according [sic] with
laws and relevant administrative regulations”
(Xinhuanet.com 2011).
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Table A.1. (cont’d)
Guide/standard Date Issuing organization Key content
16. Principles of
sustainable
development of
state-owned
enterprises during
12th Five-Year Plan
period
September 2011 State-owned Assets
Supervision and
Administration
Commission
The guide proposes that sustainable development should be
the core of corporate social responsibilities, and state-owned
enterprises should be harmonious in development with
society and the environment. The state-owned enterprises
should be a role model for social responsibility.
Note. We have reported examples beyond our observation period (2006–2009) to show that the Chinese government continues to issue
legitimacy guidelines on the focal issue.
Endnotes
1Note that almost all of these communications between
the government and business enterprises have used terms
such as “guidelines/guide” ( ), “opinions” ( ),
“recommended practices” ( ), and “outlines” ( ) and
have almost never used terms such as “policies” ( ) and
“enforcement/regulations” ( ). So although these commu-
nications are not explicitly coercive, the government signal is
clear: enterprises are encouraged to engage in CSR activities.
2We acknowledge that issuing more detailed reports could just
be a more elaborate form of decoupling whereby firms fab-
ricate the specific details of their CSR activities. Below, we
discuss some supplementary research and analysis suggesting
that assessing the level of detail and substance of the CSR
report does correspond to substantive CSR implementation.
3Before these reforms, the financial organization of the Com-
munist state was highly centralized, even more so than in
other Communist countries (Walder 2000). Industrial invest-
ment, savings rates, the extraction of economic value, and the
prices of products and services were all controlled by the cen-
tral planning system.
4To further verify that using the RKS data was a valid way to
assess the substantiveness of CSR reporting, we investigated
the CSR activities and reporting (from the firm’s websites and
press releases as well as from its CSR report) of the five
highest-scoring and five lowest-scoring firms. For example,
the Ping’an report, which earned the highest score of all the
2009 reports, included detailed systematic information about
the firm’s CSR activities. The report that earned the lowest
evaluation discussed only the firm’s CSR activities generally
and briefly. We also checked correlations between each RKS
rating and two other indications of CSR report substantiveness:
page count and the use of GRI 3.0 guidelines. The correlations
were 0.82 and 0.60, respectively, which provided convergent
validity for our measure. Finally, we interviewed consultants
at two CSR consulting firms (one China-based and one inter-
national) that help firms produce CSR reports. We showed
them the RKS list of items and methodology and asked if they
felt that higher scores would be reliable indicators of more
substantive CSR activity. Both felt that, because of the speci-
ficity of the items measured, they were virtually certain that
such reporting indicated greater CSR implementation. These
investigations left us confident that the RKS data are a valid
representation of the substantiveness of CSR reporting.
5In robustness checks, we also used a continuous variable of
the ownership percentage. The results are consistent with what
we present in the paper, except that one of the interaction
effects becomes marginally significant. Results are available
from the authors on request.
6In previous research, the concept of a CEO’s political con-
nection was measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
CEO was either a member of the NPC or the CPPCC or a
government official (Fan et al. 2007, Li et al. 2006). However,
our theoretical approach distinguishes between membership in
political congresses and bureaucratic embeddedness.
7The corporate governance group was initiated by the
Shanghai Stock Exchange to promote better corporate gover-
nance structure. Corporations on the exchange can apply to
be included. Applications are evaluated and either accepted or
rejected by a special committee organized by the exchange.
In general, companies in this group are thought to have better
governance practices.
8Note that just because a firm’s characteristics suggest it would
be required to issue a report does not mean that the firm did
so. In our sample, of the firms that were required to issue a
report in a given year, 31% did not. Excluding required firms
from the analysis of firms issuing CSR reports did not change
the results.
9Because including Yt−1 as a regressor could create an autocor-
relation risk, as a robustness check, we ran the models without
Yt−1 and obtained similar results.
10These categories are agriculture, forestry, livestock farming,
fishery; mining; manufacturing; electric power, gas, and water
production and supply; construction; transport and storage;
information technology; wholesale and retail trade; finance and
insurance; real estate; social service; communication and cul-
ture; and others.
11In supplementary analyses, we examined whether different
types of industries were more likely to issue CSR reports
or to provide more substantive reports. Of particular interest
were those industries that are more closely connected to the
government, for example, by being more regulated. However,
these investigations did not produce any statistically significant
relationships.
12We conducted two alternative specifications as robustness
checks. First, we ran random effects models (xtlogit and xtreg)
as an alternative way to control for multiple observations per
firm. Results were identical to those we report. (We were
unable to implement fixed effects because of the limited num-
ber of observations per firm and because some of our variables
are time-invariant.) We used the standard logit and OLS mod-
els with robust standard errors for ease of interpretation. Fur-
thermore, we also estimated these two analyses as a two-stage
Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) with the variable
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stock market exchange as the instrument. Significance levels
of hypothesized coefficients and resulting interpretations are
identical. This is a potentially valid way to test our predic-
tions because our two dependent variables are interrelated in
such a way that the rating of CSR reporting substantiveness
is contingent on whether the focal firm has issued a CSR
report. Furthermore, it is arguable that stock market exchange
serves as a valid instrument because, during our time period,
the two stock exchanges had different policies and guidelines
on whether a firm should report, but neither made specific
requirements about the quality of the reports. These results are
available from the authors on request.
13Note that this is only 83% of the 954 CSR reports that have
been issued since 2006 because the RKS data are only avail-
able for 2008 and 2009.
14Further robustness checks with the inteff procedure in Stata
indicate that the coefficients of the interaction term between
private control and firm age and the interaction term between
private control and slack resources were both statistically sig-
nificant (Hoetker 2007, Norton et al. 2004), which provides
further evidence that our results are robust.
References
Aiken LS, West SG (1991) Multiple Regression: Testing and Inter-
preting Interactions (Sage, Newbury Park, CA).
Bai CE, Lu J, Tao Z (2006) Property rights protection and access to
bank loans. Econom. Transition 14(4):611–628.
Barnett ML (2007) Stakeholder influence capacity and the variabil-
ity of financial returns to corporate social responsibility. Acad.
Management Rev. 32(3):794–816.
Baron DP (1995) Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket compo-
nents. Calif. Management Rev. 37(2):47–65.
Bonardi JP, Hillman AJ, Keim GD (2005) The attractiveness of polit-
ical markets: Implications for firm strategy. Acad. Management
Rev. 30(2):397–413.
Bonardi JP, Holburn GLF, Bergh RGV (2006) Nonmarket strategy
performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities. Acad. Man-
agement J. 49(6):1209–1228.
Brandt L, Li H (2003) Bank discrimination in transition economies:
Ideology, information, or incentives? J. Comparative Econom.
31(3):387–413.
Brown AD (1998) Narrative, politics and legitimacy in an IT imple-
mentation. J. Management Stud. 35(1):35–58.
Campbell JL (2007) Why would corporations behave in socially
responsible ways? An institutional theory of corporate social
responsibility. Acad. Management Rev. 32(3):946–967.
Carow K, Heron R, Saxton T (2004) Do early birds get the returns?
An empirical investigation of early-mover advantages in acqui-
sitions. Strategic Management J. 25(6):563–585.
Chen W (2007) Does the color of the cat matter? The red hat strat-
egy in China’s private enterprises. Management Organ. Rev.
3(1):55–80.
ChinaCSR.com (2009) How far can Chinese companies take corpo-
rate social responsibility? (February 23) http://www.chinacsr
.com/en/2009/02/23/4572-how-far-can-chinese-companies-take-
corporate-social-responsibility/.
China WTO Tribune (2009) Four discoveries of the research on CSR
reports in China from 2001 to 2009. [In Chinese.] (December 2)
http://www.wtoguide.net/Html/tbgz/06122515571068955091271
627382793311.html.
Deephouse D, Suchman MC (2008) Legitimacy in organizational
Institutionalism. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Suddaby R, Sahlin-
Andersson K, eds. The Sage Handbook of Organizational Insti-
tutionalism (Sage, London), 49–77.
Dickson BJ (2003) Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private
Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK).
Dobbin F, Sutton FR (1998) The strength of a weak state: The rights
revolution and the rise of human resources management divi-
sions. Amer. J. Sociol. 104(2):441–476.
Dobbin F, Schrage D, Kalev A (2009) Someone to watch over
me: Coupling, decoupling, and unintended consequences in cor-
porate equal opportunity. Working paper, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA.
Dobbin F, Sutton J, Meyer J, Scott WR (1993) Equal opportunity law
and the construction of internal labor markets. Amer. J. Sociol.
99:396–427.
Eccles RG, Krzus MP (2010) One Report: Integrated Reporting for
a Sustainable Strategy (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, N.J).
Edelman LB (1990) Legal environments and organizational gover-
nance: The expansion of due process in the American work-
place. Amer. J. Sociol. 95:1401–1440.
Edelman LB (1992) Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Orga-
nizational mediation of civil rights law. Amer. J. Sociol.
97:1531–1576.
Edelman LB, Suchman MC (1997) The legal environments of orga-
nizations. Annual Rev. Sociol. 23:479–515.
Elsbach KD, Sutton RI (1992) Acquiring organizational legiti-
macy through illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional
and impression management theories. Acad. Management J.
35(4):699–738.
Faccio M (2006) Politically connected firms. Amer. Econom. Rev.
96(1):369–386.
Faccio M, Lang LHP (2002) The ultimate ownership of Western
European corporations. J. Financial Econom. 65(3):365–395.
Faccio M, Masulis RW, McConnell JJ (2006) Political connections
and corporate bailouts. J. Finance 61(6):2597–2635.
Fan JPH, Wong TJ, Zhang T (2007) Politically connected CEOs, cor-
porate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly
partially privatized firms. J. Financial Econom. 84(2):330–357.
Farashahi M, Hafsi T (2009) Strategy of firms in unstable institutional
environments. Asia Pacific J. Management 26(4):643–666.
Goldstein SM (1995) China in transition: The political foundations of
incremental reform. China Quart. 144:1105–1131.
Greene W (2010) Testing hypotheses about interaction terms in non-
linear models. Econom. Lett. 107(2):291–296.
Guthrie D (2009) China and Globalization: The Social, Economic
and Political Transformation of Chinese Society, revised ed.
(Routledge, New York).
He Y, Tian Z (2008) Government-oriented corporate public rela-
tion strategies in transitional China. Management Organ. Rev.
4(3):367–391.
Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error.
Econometrica 47(1):153–161.
Hiatt S, Park S (2013) Lords of the harvest: Third-party influence and
regulatory approval of genetically modified organisms. Acad.
Management J. 56(4):923–944.
Hillman AJ (2003) Determinants of political strategies in U.S. multi-
nationals. Bus. Soc. 42(4):455–484.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.10
3.1
49
.52
] o
n 2
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
, a
t 0
6:4
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marquis and Qian: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?
Organization Science 25(1), pp. 127–148, © 2014 INFORMS 147
Hillman AJ (2005) Politicians on the board of directors: Do connec-
tions affect the bottom line? J. Management 31(3):464–481.
Hillman AJ, Keim GD, Schuler D (2004) Corporate political activity:
A review and research agenda. J. Management 30(6):837–857.
Hillman AJ, Zardkoohi A, Bierman L (1999) Corporate political
strategies and firm performance: Indications of firm-specific
benefits from personal service in the U.S. government. Strategic
Management J. 20(1):67–81.
Hitt MA, Hoskisson RE, Kim H (1997) International diversifica-
tion: Effects on innovation and firm performance in product-
diversified firms. Acad. Management J. 40(4):767–798.
Hoetker G (2007) The use of logit and probit models in strategic
management research: Critical issues. Strategic Management J.
28(4):331–343.
Hong Z (2004) Mapping the evolution and transformation of the
new private entrepreneurs in China. J. Chinese Political Sci.
9(1):23–42.
Huang Y (2008) Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics:
Entrepreneurship and the State (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, New York).
Kogut B, Zander U (2000) Did socialism fail to innovate? A natu-
ral experiment of the two Zeiss companies. Amer. Sociol. Rev.
65(2):169–190.
KPMG (2008) KPMG international survey of corporate responsibility
reporting 2008. Report, KPMG International, Amsterdam.
http://www.kpmg.com/EU/en/Documents/KPMG_International
_survey_Corporate_responsibility_Survey_Reporting_2008.pdf.
Kriauciunas A, Kale P (2006) The impact of socialist imprinting and
search on resource change: A study of firms in Lithuania. Strate-
gic Management J. 27(7):659–679.
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (1999) Corporate owner-
ship around the world. J. Finance 54(2):471–518.
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1998) Law
and finance. J. Political Econom. 106:1113–1155.
Li J, Qian C (2013) Principal–principal conflicts under weak institu-
tions: A study of corporate takeovers in China. Strategic Man-
agement J. 34(4):498–508.
Li H, Zhang Y (2007) The role of managers’ political networking
and functional experience in new venture performance: Evi-
dence from China’s transition economy. Strategic Management
J. 28(8):791–804.
Li H, Meng L, Zhang J (2006) Why do entrepreneurs enter politics?
Evidence from China. Econom. Inquiry 44(3):559–578.
Li H, Meng L, Wang Q, Zhou LA (2008) Political connections,
financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private
firms. J. Development Econom. 87(2):283–299.
Lin LW (2010) Corporate social responsibility in China: Win-
dow dressing or structural change? Berkeley J. Internat. Law
28(1):64–100.
Lord MD (2000) Corporate political strategy and legislative decision
making: The impact of corporate legislative influence activities.
Bus. Soc. 39(1):76–93.
Luo Y (2003) Industrial dynamics and managerial networking in an
emerging market: The case of China. Strategic Management J.
24(13):1315–1327.
Lyon TP, Maxwell JW (2011) Greenwash: Environmental disclo-
sure under threat of audit. J. Econom. Management Strategy
20(1):3–41.
Ma D, Parish WL (2006) Tocquevillian moments: Charitable
contributions by Chinese private entrepreneurs. Soc. Forces
85(2):943–964.
Marquis C, Huang Z (2010) Acquisitions as exaptation: The legacy of
founding institutions in the U.S. commercial banking industry.
Acad. Management J. 53(6):1441–1473.
Marquis C, Tilcsik A (2013) Imprinting: Toward a multi-level theory.
Acad. Management Ann. 7(1):193–243.
Marquis C, Yin L, Yang D (2011) COSCO: Implementing sustain-
ability HBS Case 412081, Harvard Business School, Boston.
Marquis C, Zhang J, Zhou Y (2011) Regulatory uncertainty and cor-
porate responses to environmental protection in China. Calif.
Management Rev. 54(1):39–63.
Marquis C, Dai N, Yang D, Wu H (2010) State grid: Corporate social
responsibility HBS Case 410141, Harvard Business School,
Boston.
Meyer JW, Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: Formal
structure as myth and ceremony. Amer. J. Sociol. 83(2):340–363.
Meyer MW, Rowan B (1978) The structure of educational organiza-
tions. Meyer MW et al., eds. Environments and Organizations,
1st ed. (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco), 78–109.
Mizruchi MS (1992) The Structure of Corporate Political Action:
Interfirm Relations and Their Consequences (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA).
Naughton B (2007) The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
Nee V (1992) Organizational dynamics of market transition: Hybrid
forms, property rights, and mixed economy in China. Admin.
Sci. Quart. 37(1):1–27.
Norton EC, Wang H, Ai C (2004) Computing interaction effects and
standard errors in logit and probit models. Stata J. 4(2):154–167.
O’Brien KJ (1990) Reform Without Liberalization: China’s National
People’s Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change
(Cambridge University Press, New York).
Okhmatovskiy I, David RJ (2012) Setting your own standards: Inter-
nal corporate governance codes as a response to institutional
pressure. Organ. Sci. 23(1):155–176.
Oliver C (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes. Acad.
Management Rev. 16(1):145–179.
Oliver C, Holzinger I (2008) The effectiveness of strategic political
management: A dynamic capabilities framework. Acad. Man-
agement Rev. 33(2):496–520.
Park S, Sine WD, Tolbert PS (2011) Professions, organizations, and
institutions: Tenure systems in colleges and universities. Work
Occupations 38(3):340–371.
Pearce JL, De Castro JO, Guillen MF (2008) Influencing politics
and political systems: Political systems and corporate strategies
(introduction to special topic forum). Acad. Management Rev.
33(2):493–495.
Peng MW, Heath PS (1996) The growth of the firm in planned
economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic
choice. Acad. Management Rev. 21(2):492–528.
Peng MW, Luo Y (2000) Managerial ties and firm performance in
a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Acad.
Management J. 43(3):486–501.
Peng Y (2004) Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China’s tran-
sitional economy. Amer. J. Sociol. 109(5):1045–1074.
Pfeffer J, Salancik G (1978) The External Control of Organizations
(Harper & Row, New York).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.10
3.1
49
.52
] o
n 2
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
, a
t 0
6:4
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marquis and Qian: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?
148 Organization Science 25(1), pp. 127–148, © 2014 INFORMS
Quasney TJ (2003) Competitive interaction: A study of market, non-
market and integrated competitive behavior. Unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park.
Ryan TP (1997) Modern Regression Methods (John Wiley & Sons,
New York).
Saich T (2001) Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave,
New York).
Schuler DA, Rehbein K (1997) The filtering role of the firm in cor-
porate political involvement. Bus. Soc. 36(2):116–139.
Schuler DA, Rehbein K, Cramer RD (2002) Pursuing strategic advan-
tage through political means: A multivariate approach. Acad.
Management J. 45(4):659–672.
Scott WR (2001) Institutions and Organizations, 2nd ed. (Sage, Thou-
sand Oaks, CA).
Scott WR (2008) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests,
3rd ed. (Sage, Los Angeles).
See G (2009) Harmonious society and Chinese CSR: Is there really
a link? J. Bus. Ethics 89:1–22.
Seifert B, Morris SA, Bartkus BR (2004) Having, giving, and get-
ting: Slack resources, corporate philanthropy, and firm financial
performance. Bus. Soc. 43(2):135–161.
Short JL, Toffel MW (2010) Making self-regulation more than merely
symbolic: The critical role of the legal environment. Admin. Sci.
Quart. 55(3):361–396.
Siegel J (2007) Contingent political capital and international alliances:
Evidence from South Korea. Admin. Sci. Quart. 52(4):621–666.
Sino-Swedish CSR Cooperation (2009) Interpreting CSR policy for
large Chinese SOEs. Press release (May 14), http://csr2.mofcom
.gov.cn/article/laws/200905/20090506246453.shtml.
Stinchcombe AL (1965) Social structure and organizations. March
JG, ed. Handbook of Organizations (Rand McNally & Co.,
Chicago), 142–193.
Tian Z, Hafsi T, Wu W (2009) Institutional determinism and political
strategies. Bus. Soc. 48(3):284–325.
Tilcsik A (2010) From ritual to reality: Demography, ideology, and
decoupling in a post-Communist government agency. Acad.
Management J. 53(6):1474–1498.
Tsui AS (2007) From homogenization to pluralism: International
management research in the academy and beyond. Acad. Man-
agement J. 50(6):1353–1364.
Waddock SA, Graves SB (1997) The corporate social performance-
financial performance link. Strategic Management J.
18(4):303–319.
Walder AG (1995) Local governments as industrial firms: An
organizational analysis of China’s transitional economy. Amer.
J. Sociol. 101(2):263–301.
Walder AG (2000) China’s transitional economy. Li JT, Tsui AS,
Weldon E, eds. Management and Organizations in the Chinese
Context (St. Martin’s Press, New York), 63–83.
Wang H, Qian C (2011) Corporate philanthropy and corporate finan-
cial performance: The roles of stakeholder response and political
access. Acad. Management J. 54(6):1159–1181.
Wang H, Choi J, Li J (2008) Too little or too much? Untangling the
relationship between corporate philanthropy and firm financial
performance. Organ. Sci. 19(1):143–159.
Wang Q, Wong TJ, Xia L (2008) State ownership, the institu-
tional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China.
J. Accounting Econom. 46(1):112–134.
Westphal JD, Zajac EJ (1994) Substance and symbolism in CEOs’
long-term incentive plans. Admin. Sci. Quart. 39(3):367–390.
Westphal JD, Zajac EJ (1995) Who shall govern? CEO/Board power,
demographic similarity, and new director selection. Admin. Sci.
Quart. 40(1):60–83.
Westphal JD, Zajac EJ (2001) Decoupling policy from practice:
The case of stock repurchase programs. Admin. Sci. Quart.
46(2):202–228.
Xinhuanet.com (2011) Chinese ministry vows more transparency for
charitable organizations. (July 15) http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english2010/china/2011-07/15/c_13988257.htm.
Yin G, Li W, Yu Z, Zheng R, Li W (2008) How to Write a CSR
Report, Chinese ed. (Golden Bee Development Center for Chi-
nese CSR/China WTO Tribune, Beijing).
Young MN, Peng MW, Ahlstrom D, Bruton GD, Jiang Y (2008)
Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review
of the principal–principal perspective. J. Management Stud.
45(1):196–220.
Zajac EJ, Westphal JD (2004) The social construction of market value:
Institutionalization and learning perspectives on stock market
reactions. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 69(3):433–457.
Zhong HW (2009) Guidelines of Chinese Firms’ Social Report-
ing (CASS-CSR 1.0) (Economy and Management Publishing,
Beijing).
Christopher Marquis is an associate professor in the Orga-
nizational Behavior unit at the Harvard Business School. His
research is focused on how firm behavior is shaped by broader
contexts such as embeddedness in geographic communities
and how environmental conditions during founding periods
leave a lasting imprint on organizations. He is exploring these
issues in the context of the global corporate social respon-
sibility and how environmental sustainability initiatives have
developed in China.
Cuili Qian is an assistant professor in the management
department at the College of Business, City University of
Hong Kong. Her current research focuses on corporate stake-
holders and social responsibility, corporate political strategies,
and corporate governance. She is exploring these issues in the
context of transition economies, particularly in China.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.10
3.1
49
.52
] o
n 2
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
, a
t 0
6:4
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
